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Introduction  
 In this essay, I argue that Socratic or Platonic1 dialectic is not a method that follows rigid 
structures as is suggested by for example the model of the elenchus.2 Although the Greek 
methodos (meta hodos) refers to the established or public road (hodos), a road that is already 
there, I argue that unlike this traditional methodos Platonic dialectic is a method that is open; it 
does not develop through a specific plan. There is not a blueprint or a standard formula that is 
used by either Socrates or Plato. Encountering a dialogue therefore requires flexibility of the 
interlocutors, and most of all of the reader. In the following, I discuss the Phaedo and the 
Protagoras, two dialogues that do not follow the model of the elenchus. The method of the 
Protagoras might appear as a variation of the elenchus, but is in fact a radically different model: 
Socrates and Protagoras exchange positions. Their discussion evolves around the question which 
method to use in that very discussion. As I will argue, the exchange of positions that takes place 
during this dialogue is related to the change in method: the sophistic method of monologues and a 
method that involves dialogue, respectively. The other main dialogue discussed in this essay is 
the Phaedo, in which – if we want to use this term – a complete reversal of the model of the 
elenchus is at work. It is namely not Socrates who proves that his interlocutors’ definition of x is 
false; the interlocutors themselves show the limitations of their own theory. 
Instead of using the model of the elenchus I will provide an alternative terminology, with which 
dialectic can be described as what I call an “open” method. The Platonic corpus itself offers us 
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such an alternative terminology in metaphors that refer to labyrinths and navigation, metaphors 
that in the Phaedo and the Protagoras – as I will argue – symbolize the Platonic method.3 Both 
navigators and philosophers deal with  “things” that are not ready to hand (navigators with stars, 
the wind and the days of the year, the philosopher with the ideal forms) and both are dealing with 
these eternal truths within a world that is characterized by change or flux. In relating philosophy 
and navigation the guiding question will be: what exactly is the similarity between navigating 
through the sea, and navigating through a dialogue? 
The metaphor of the labyrinth refers to difficulties in finding a way.4 The labyrinth appears 
implicitly in the Phaedo in a reference to the myth of Theseus and the Minotaur. As I argue, the 
labyrinth is a symbol for philosophical issues discussed in the dialogue. The architectural 
structure of the labyrinth is (re)constructed by different arguments and gestures made by the 
participants of the dialogue, as well as by the narrative structure. We, as readers of the Platonic 
dialogue, enter this labyrinth of ways and non-ways, through which we somehow have to find our 
way. In discussing this second metaphor I will provide a brief account of some of the arguments 
of the Phaedo, focusing upon the methodological proceedings. As I will argue, the construction 
and re-construction (through the reader) of a dialogue is similar to building a labyrinth. Likewise, 
finding a way through the arguments of a dialogue is comparable to finding a way through a 
labyrinth. 
 
Finding a Method: From Sophistry to Socratic Dialectic in the Protagoras 
The Protagoras is one of the few Socratic dialogues dealing explicitly with method. Socrates’ 
discussion with the sophist Protagoras leads us, in the middle of the dialogue, into a crisis about 
which method is going to be used. Although this is the pinnacle of the discussion, the issue of 
method is already foreshadowed from the very beginning of the dialogue. Prior to the meeting 
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with Protagoras, Socrates warns Hippocrates, who wants to take classes with the famous sophist, 
against the dangers of sophistry and asks Hippocrates his famous “what” question: “about what 
does the sophist make one a clever speaker?”5 This is a question Hippocrates cannot answer, and 
with which Socrates points to the heart of the problem: the sophist is not concerned with any 
issue in particular, but the sophist simply makes one a clever speaker. His technique or method, 
“the how” of his teachings is not different from what he teaches. The sophist is simply a 
persuader, a technician without a field of expertise. Accordingly, someone who is being taught by 
a sophist becomes a clever speaker, who can persuade others.  
After Hippocrates and Socrates have met Protagoras, one of the first things Protagoras tells them 
is that he himself does “not conform to the method”6 many other sophists make use of. Others 
often “disguise” their art (tšcnh) by making use of other arts – such as poetry, mystic rites, music 
or even athletics – as outer coverings. Protagoras does not cover the art of sophistry, since “the 
multitude, of course, perceive practically nothing, but merely echo this or that pronouncement of 
their leader.”7 The great sophist is concerned here with the fact that most people simply repeat 
what their teacher tells them, without perceiving the art or technique (techne) that was used to get 
to such a pronouncement. To cover up the art of sophistry with other technai involves the danger 
of making this process even harder to perceive. Protagoras, instead, wants to make the method as 
transparent as possible. This “open method” is a civic science (politk¾n tšcnhn)8 with which he 
teaches virtue, or assists others in order to become good.  
Socrates, on the other hand, does not think that it is possible to teach others to become good, and 
thus Protagoras has to defend his techne. He does so by giving a couple of long discourses, which 
– in the middle of the dialogue – makes Socrates say: “if someone addresses me at length I forget 
the subject on which he is talking.”9 This remark about Socrates’ bad memory is the beginning of 
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a discussion on which method to use. Socrates questions Protagoras’ description of his “open 
method” – his art without outer coverings. Socrates implicitly claims that Protagoras’ sophistry is 
not transparent at all, since his speeches are so long that his audience simply forgets what he is 
even talking about. Protagoras replies by stating that if he would “argue simply in the way my 
opponent demanded, I should not be held superior to anyone nor would Protagoras have made a 
name among the Greeks.”10 The two face a real crisis here, in which Socrates even attempts to 
leave the scene. The intervention of Callias, Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus and Hippias is needed 
to keep Socrates and Protagoras in dialogue, or rather to get them into a true Socratic dialogue. 
Alcibiades states the dilemma and the solution as follows: “if Protagoras confesses himself 
inferior to Socrates in argumentation [διαλεχθε̃ναι], Socrates has no more to ask: but if he 
challenges him, let him discuss [διαλεγέστω] by question and answer; not spinning out a lecture 
on each question – beating off the arguments, refusing to give a reason, and so dilating until most 
of his hearers have forgotten the point at issue.”11 Protagoras is here characterized as the person 
who gives long speeches and Socrates as the person who is good in argumentation. The transition 
to the Socratic method is then a transition to dialectic, or dialogue, a transition to question and 
answer.  
The dialectical method is enforced in the second half of the dialogue in a discussion of “being” 
and “becoming.” In interpreting a poem of Simonides, one of Socrates’ claims is that “to become 
good, indeed, is hard, though possible, but to be good is impossible.”12 One cannot simply be 
good, but one actually has to do things in order to become good. Virtue can only be pursued or 
taught through praxis. This praxis seems, for Socrates, first of all, to be actively involved in a 
dialogue. Virtue cannot be learned by simply listening to someone else, but one needs to develop 
one’s own knowledge by actively participating in a dialogue. Virtue, thus, cannot be taught by 
Protagoras’ techne – in which one listens to long monologues – but, if it is teachable, then it can 
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be taught by way of dialectic. I will further develop this distinction between techne and dialectic 
in the discussion of the Republic below.  
The discussion about being and becoming eventually leads to a reversal of the positions of 
Protagoras and Socrates: at the end of the dialogue, Socrates believes that virtue can be taught, 
while Protagoras doubts this. This reversal of positions can be explained as follows: Socrates 
does not think that virtue can be taught if Protagoras’ method is used. If virtue can be taught, it is 
only possible by way of dialectic, i.e., by a process of becoming. Protagoras, on the other hand, 
seems to be convinced by Socrates that virtue cannot by taught by his method, i.e., by sophistry, 
but he does not want to commit himself to dialectic. This reversal of positions has, in a sense, 
been anticipated by Socrates at the beginning of their discussion when he stated that “even you 
[Protagoras], though so old and so wise, would be made better if someone taught you what you 
happen not to know.”13 Socrates here already emphasizes the theme of becoming. Protagoras can 
be made better, he can become better, and at the end of the dialogue is made better by Socrates, 
who showed him something he did not happen to know, namely that virtue cannot be taught, at 
least not with the sophistic method. 
Since Socrates and Protagoras have reversed positions, they both have appropriated the position 
of the other, and in doing so their positions are still opposed to one another. This makes Socrates 
say: “what strange [¨topo…] creatures you are, Socrates and Protagoras.”14 This strangeness, this 
not being designated to a particular place (atopos) emerges at the end of the dialogue, but it is 
precisely what makes the dialogue possible in the first place. If the interlocutors are not willing to 
change their positions, a process or development is impossible. The interlocutors have to be 
willing to re-locate themselves, to change topos, in order to make a dialogue possible. Openness 
to other positions, which we could call strangeness, can be considered as a condition for the 
possibility of Socratic dialectic. 
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Navigation: How to Distinguish Ways from Non-Ways? 
After the interlocutors in the Protagoras have decided to use the Socratic method – a crucial 
point in the dialogue – an important image comes to the fore when Hippias, who is also a sophist, 
advises Socrates and Protagoras, and says to Protagoras that he must not “let out full sail, as you 
run before the breeze, and so escape into the ocean of speech leaving the land nowhere in 
sight.”15 Protagoras should shorten his speeches so that his listeners do not get lost in his ocean of 
speech. Protagoras’ “escape into the ocean” is again an indication that his method is not open, or 
transparent.  The listeners loose sight of land, the starting-point of the discussion, and get lost in 
the ocean, the long speech. This image of philosophy as a voyage through the sea is one of the 
many references to the sea and navigation within the Platonic corpus. This might appear to be 
insignificant in the works of someone who lived close to the sea, but its occurrence at this point 
in the dialogue is striking: Plato here makes a reference to sailing and the possibility of being lost 
in the ocean of speech at a decisive point in the dialogue where the way how to proceed is 
decided. Is there a similarity between sailing a ship through the sea and making one’s way 
through a dialogue? Is doing dialectic an art of navigation? In the following I will discuss this 
metaphor in some more detail, by looking into some other remarkable uses of the imagery of 
sailing and navigation within the Platonic corpus. 
In Book VI of the Republic we do find one of the most concrete references to navigation16 when 
Socrates likens the government of a city to that of a ship.17 This “allegory of the ship” – as I will 
call it – describes the situation of the captain of a ship who does not have a decent knowledge of 
navigation to begin with. When a sailor persuades the captain to turn over the helm to him, the 
situation on the ship becomes even worse, since the sailors do not know “that for the true pilot it 
is necessary to pay careful attention to year, seasons, heaven, stars, winds and everything that’s 
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proper to the art.”18 Additionally, the sailors do not consider navigation to be something 
learnable. Instead, they consider that person most knowledgeable who is able to persuade the 
captain to turn over the helm, and thus gain control of the ship. From this perspective the true 
pilot – the one who actually pays careful attention to the year, seasons, heaven, stars, and winds – 
is thought to be a mere stargazer.  
This allegory symbolizes how people in the city think about philosophers: similar to navigators, 
philosophers deal with intangible objects. Their methods of navigating – through life or through 
the sea – raise suspicion precisely because both are dealing with intangible objects. On the ship, 
as well as in the city, it is considered more important to persuade others than to look behind the 
immediate world of experience. The sailor who is good in persuading others represents the 
sophist who can teach how to persuade others, but cannot teach how to become good citizens, or 
how to navigate through the problems of life. The navigator, on the other hand, is looking at that 
which is eternal in order to determine the right course of the ship in situations that are always 
different. Similarly, the philosopher observes “that which is eternal and not wandering between 
the two poles of generation and decay.”19 Philosophers are “those who are capable of 
apprehending [™f£ptesqai] that which is eternal and unchanging.”20 As the apprehension of the 
position of the stars has a practical application for the navigator, the apprehension of the ideal 
realities does, for Socrates, have a practical application since it allows one to establish “the laws 
of the beautiful, the just and the good.”21 The knowledge of the forms (eide) can guide us in 
determining the right course in a life in which everything is constantly changing.22  
However, the application of this knowledge is something different than dialectic, i.e., the process 
by which one can gain this knowledge. Knowledge of the things that are cannot be gained 
through leaving hypotheses untouched,23 but one needs to be able to give an account of them. The 
dialectical “process of inquiry” destroys or does away with hypotheses “up to the first principle 
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itself in order to find confirmation there.”24 We could say then that dialectic and navigation do 
have in common that they both deal with intangible eternal things within a world that is in a 
constant flux. However, the navigator already has knowledge of these intangible things and 
applies this knowledge when he determines the best course of the ship. The philosopher, on the 
other hand, still has to gain knowledge of the forms. Dialectic is a way by which we can gain 
such knowledge, i.e., proceed to the first principles. In the Protagoras we found a distinction 
between the sophistic techne and (philosophical) dialectic. In the Republic, it becomes clear that 
dialectic is not completely separated from technai, which “can be described as assistants and 
helpers in the turning around of others.”25 The process of dialectic, therefore, can make use of 
technai, but is itself not a techne. Since it is a destruction of hypotheses and a search for the truth, 
it can be described as a journey of which the path is to be determined as we go along, here 
expressed with the image of navigation. 
In the Protagoras we found the metaphor of sailing at a crucial point in the dialogue, when the 
method with which to proceed was being determined. This metaphor is also used in the Phaedo 
when Socrates narrates his educational “autobiography,” and turns to his famous “second 
sailing.”26 In the prelude to this journey Simmias introduces the idea of finding the strongest 
vessel, i.e., logos, to travel with. This idea appears in the context of the discussion of the 
immortality of the soul. Simmias admits that it is “either impossible or very difficult to acquire 
clear knowledge about these matters in this life.”27 What we can do instead, when we cannot find 
the truth – in this case the truth concerning the immortality of the soul – is to find the human 
logos that is “best and hardest to disprove.”28 One has to embark upon this logos “as upon a raft, 
sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon a stronger vessel, some 
divine revelation [λόγου θείου], and make his voyage more safely and securely.”29 Sarah Kofman 
discusses the crossing of a sea as a path that has to be found each time as if for the first time: “the 
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sea is the endless realm of pure movement, the most mobile, changeable and polymorphous of all 
spaces, a space where any way that has been traced is immediately obliterated, which transforms 
any journey into a voyage of exploration which is always unprecedented, dangerous and 
uncertain.”30 It is this unprecedented, dangerous, and uncertain voyage we are making with 
Socrates in the Phaedo. In Socrates’ characterization of this voyage he reiterates Simmias’ idea 
of finding the best possible logos: “I put down as hypothesis whatever account [λόγον] I judge to 
be mightiest.”31 One could say then that the best possible or the mightiest logos has to serve as a 
vessel with which we can travel through the sea, that “mobile, changeable and polymorphous” 
space in which each way is immediately erased. There is not one way to go through the dialogue 
or the sea; there is, rather, a manifold of possibilities. These ways are not established, but are, 
rather, ways that still have to be found, or even still need to be created. This idea of a plurality of 
possible ways and the creation of these ways is emphasized in Socrates’ “autobiography” (96a –
102a) that leads into the second sailing.32 Just like Protagoras, Socrates now tells us that he does 
not use the method of others. Instead, he has “randomly smushed together [εὶκη̃ φύρω] another 
way [τρόπον].”33 This way is then introduced as the “second sailing,” a nautical term referring to 
the use of oars due to a lack of wind. The wind, possibly a metaphor for a divine truth, is failing 
for Socrates, and he has randomly smushed together another method while crossing through the 
sea. The strongest vessel he can find to make this voyage is the theory of the forms. The journey 
itself, i.e., the dialogue, can make this vessel even stronger.  
 
The Dialectical Labyrinth; From Pythagorean Opposites to Socratic Logos 
In the last part of this paper I discuss the dialogue, or voyage, in more detail by focusing on 
another metaphor, namely the labyrinth. This image is evoked in the beginning of the dialogue 
when Phaedo starts his narration of the circumstances surrounding Socrates’ death, by 
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mentioning “a vow” the Athenians made to Apollo “to send a mission every year to Delos”34 if 
the fourteen youths and maidens were saved. Phaedo refers here to the myth of “Theseus and the 
Minotaur,” according to which the Minotaur (the bull of Minos, a creature half man half bull) is 
the result of the greed and selfishness of King Minos of Crete. When he did not sacrifice the most 
beautiful bull of his herd to the gods, as he should have done, the gods took revenge by letting his 
wife, Pasiphaê, fall in love with the bull, and after she mated with the bull, the Minotaur was 
conceived. Minos asked Daedalus (who first helped Pasiphaê to trick the bull, in order to mate 
with it) to build a labyrinth in which the beast could be kept. To keep the Minotaur satisfied 
Minos ordered the city-states that were occupied by the Cretans to sacrifice every year a 
particular number of young people to the beast. The Athenians were asked to sacrifice fourteen 
youths and maidens every year. Fortunately, Theseus appeared at the right time, and traveled with 
the fourteen to Crete. Once there, Ariadne, the daughter of Minos, fell in love with Theseus and 
told him how to get out of the labyrinth (according to some accounts of this myth she told him to 
use a thread). With her advice, he manages, after killing the Minotaur, to find the way out of the 
labyrinth, and to save the fourteen youths as well as himself.35 
Since Theseus had saved the fourteen, the Athenians sent a mission to Delos every year, as 
Phaedo tells us. This mission happened to have started on the day before Socrates’ trial. Since the 
city had to keep itself pure, and could not execute anyone during the trip of the ship to Delos and 
back, and since this trip sometimes takes a long time “when contrary winds detain it […] Socrates 
passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death.”36 Here, right at the outset of the 
dialogue, is thus another reference to traveling by boat, and the difficulties such a journey can 
involve, such as contrary winds.   
After referring to the myth, Phaedo introduces us to fourteen of Socrates’ friends who are present 
in the prison. This number of friends – the twice seven (dis hepta), as Phaedo says37 – is another 
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reference to the myth in which fourteen youths and maidens are saved by Theseus.38 If we were 
to map the myth upon the Phaedo, we could interpret the fourteen friends as being saved by 
Socrates, while Ariadne symbolizes Phaedo, who gives us a thread in the form of the discourse, 
as a sort of “father of our debate [πατὴρ του̃ λόγου].”39 Such an interpretation would become 
immediately problematic when we try to imagine Socrates as being a Theseus, the hero who kills 
the Minotaur. Theseus kills a symptom or symbol of greed and selfishness, while Socrates 
attempts to hunt down the real causes of such a symptom.40 Instead of interpreting the Phaedo as 
a philosophical copy of the myth, I will focus here on the image of the labyrinth as a metaphor 
for the dialectical structure.41  
The first actual argument in the discussion of the immortality of the soul – or the first way in the 
labyrinth of discourse – is the argument that opposites generate one another. This argument, 
given by Socrates, is in fact a Pythagorean (or Ionic) conception of nature, and for that reason it 
is strongly supported by Simmias and Cebes, the two main interlocutors in the Phaedo, who are 
both loyal to the Pythagorean theories. Socrates argues here as follows: if something becomes 
smaller it must have been greater, otherwise it could not become smaller.42 A similar movement 
between opposites can be found in sleeping and waking, since waking up is a transition from 
sleeping to being awake.43 Again, something similar must be at work in the process of dying and 
being born. Dying is merely a transition from one state to the other, and birth is the return to the 
other state: being alive. Everything has to take part in this circular movement between contraries, 
for if there was a movement in only one direction, that is, a generation “forward in a straight line 
without turning back or curving, then […] in the end all things would have the same form.”44 
Everything that lives would die, and if life did not generate from the dead, but from the living, 
everything in the end would die.45 Assuming that everything living can die, the source of life 
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cannot be something living, otherwise it could die as well, and without this source everything 
would end up dead. The source of life, therefore, has to be something dead. 
Although this theory is interesting, it is questionable how it can contribute to a discussion about 
the immortality of the soul. Why does Socrates bring up this “physics of circularity?” As 
Gadamer writes: “What is striking about the proof is that it is obviously unsuited to prove the 
point which it is supposed to prove.”46 How can this argument prove that there is something 
immortal, something continuous that remains somehow the same in this cycle? For, it is Socrates’ 
claim that the soul does not perish when the body dies, but even flourishes when it departs from 
the body.  
To answer this question we will need to understand the structure of the arguments of the Phaedo. 
Which I will lay out in the following, starting with the anamnesis-theory, which is discussed after 
this initial argument of the circular movement between opposites. It is striking that this 
anamnesis-theory is not introduced by Socrates, who is – as we are reminded here in the Phaedo 
– “fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection.”47 Instead, anamnesis is 
brought into the discourse by Cebes. It is important to note that first Socrates makes a 
Pythagorean argument, and then Cebes, a Pythagorean, introduces a Socratic argument. We could 
then suggest that it is Socrates’ strategic plan, or method, to introduce the theory of opposites not 
because he agrees with it, but to entice his interlocutors into the dialogue, and more importantly 
to let them introduce the arguments that will eventually dismiss the theory of contraries. We 
could describe Socrates here thus again as strange or out of place (atopos). With this strange 
position in which he takes up the Pythagorean doctrine he can, as an infiltrator, attack the theory 
from the inside, or rather let his interlocutors attack the theory. In this way Socrates himself does 
not argue against their theory, but he will force his opponents to question and eventually dismiss 
their own metaphysical understanding of reality.  Socrates in this way sets up a labyrinth through 
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which his interlocutors – as well as he himself – have to find a way, which often involves taking 
some steps back and making a redirection.  
The first redirection is given by the theory of anamnesis, brought up by the Pythagorean Cebes. It 
is, eventually, Socrates himself who explains this theory in more detail, by discussing first of all 
the example of equality. He argues here that we can recognize that two things are equal to one 
another because we know equality itself, or “equality in the abstract.”48 We have not learned this 
abstraction from the sensible objects, since they all fall short of equality itself. “[I]t appears that 
we must have acquired it [equality] before we were born.”49 The soul acquired these ideas or 
forms in the purest existence of the soul, i.e., in its existence without the disturbances of the 
body. The use of these forms, such as in the recognition of the equality of two things, is a 
recollection, an anamnesis, of this knowledge. 
Socrates’ example of the equal itself (αὺτο τὸ ί̀σον)50 might be considered odd here, since 
equality is a comparison of two different things, and therefore seems to imply a relativity. The 
good, the beautiful or the circle itself, appear to be purer examples of these ideal forms. The 
example of equality has, however, another function here. It is a hint of Socrates or Plato that 
points us to the fact that the dialogue has made a turn. We have left the path we were on with the 
theory of opposites; the interlocutors have turned into an alternative way in the labyrinth. Instead 
of a change between opposites we are now looking for something that remains the same (isos), 
something that does not perish, and so escapes the physics of circularity. The dialogue is, thus, 
making a move from the opposites to something equal, a move from the Pythagorean discourse to 
the Socratic-Platonic logos. Socrates has opened the door to the two Pythagoreans by letting them 
hear what they wanted to hear. This door is now slowly dismissed by the Pythagoreans 
themselves. In doing so they assist Socrates in creating the maze of arguments and counter-
arguments. Once in this labyrinth, there is no way back, i.e., the entrance through which one 
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came does not provide an exit. Socrates has dragged them (and us) into the labyrinth, from which 
no escape is possible. 
Yet, Socrates wants to drag Simmias and Cebes even further into the labyrinth. After Simmias 
and Cebes suggest that it is only proven that our soul existed before birth (with the anamnesis-
theory), and not that it will also exist after we die, Socrates provokes the two by stating: “It has 
been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already, […] if you will combine this conclusion with the one 
we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead.”51 Socrates, of course, knows 
that the immortality of the soul is not proven by combining the anamnesis-theory with the theory 
of contraries, but wants to hear from his interlocutors what is lacking in their own theory – the 
theory of opposites. The only true Socratic method to accomplish this is by ironically stating that 
the answer already has been given. 
The final move of this strategy is made with Socrates’ silence after he has presented his 
arguments on visibility and invisibility: “Socrates himself was apparently [ὲφαίνετο] absorbed in 
what had been said.”53 Socrates’ apparent absorption can be read as an invitation to Cebes and 
Simmias – a didactic trick – again, to let them ask the questions. Socrates will, apparently, have 
to defend himself, but in fact remains the master. He guides the others, by letting them interrogate 
him, which is in fact an interrogation of their own ideas. The Pythagoreans thus interrogate the 
Pythagorean theories; a self-reflection through the medium Socrates. This idea is emphasized 
another time after Socrates’ silence, during which Simmias and Cebes start to talk to one another. 
Socrates seizes his way to complete his strategic move, and asks them whether there is any 
incompleteness in what has been said. He adds:  
“[I]f you are perplexed [ὰπορει̃τον] about all this, do not hesitate to speak up yourselves and go 
through it if it appears to you that it could have been said better. And what is more, do not 
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hesitate to take me along with you [συµπαραλαβει̃ν] if you think you will fare better 
[εὺπορήσειν] in my company.”53 
Important here are the words aporos and euporos, the first being a negation of poros, the second 
being a confirmation (in the sense of good or well) of poros. Poros is a way through or over, a 
passage, but also a resource. Poros is opposed to hodos, a (public) road that is clearly laid out. A 
poros is, instead, a way that has to be found. An aporia is the impossibility of finding this way, 
or a non-way in the labyrinth, here translated as “being perplexed.” Since poros also means 
wealth or resource we can also understand aporia as a lack of resources. Euporos can then be 
translated as having good or better resources, or being better able to find a way. What is 
suggested here is, first of all, that the way is still to be found or even has to be created (no hodos 
is available). I will return to this suggestion in the conclusion. Secondly, this passage suggests 
that together with Socrates, his two interlocutors will be more resourceful in their attempt to find 
a way. In other dialogues Socrates is often presented as a resource without resources. He is the 
philosopher who is wise because he knows he does not know. This lack of resources is precisely 
his resourcefulness, because this forces his interlocutors – who mostly think they know – into a 
dialogue. Here, in the Phaedo, his method is different: he presents a theory that is proving the 
opposite of what it is supposed to prove, but by doing this he makes the others more resourceful, 
makes it possible for them to find ways. Socrates, thus, lacks resources, but in a different way 
than by simply not knowing – as is the case in many other dialogues – since he at least provides 
us with a theory, suggesting that he knows something.55 Even while he is being questioned 
himself, Socrates is nevertheless the guide in the philosophical labyrinth, since he is – as 
described above – enticing the others in questioning their own theory; Socrates thus leads the 
others through the dialectical process. 
 16 
After Simmias compares the soul to the tuning of the lyre, Cebes compares the soul to a weaver 
who can wear out many cloaks but who will eventually die himself as well. Cebes’ argument is 
referring precisely to the lack of continuity that is provided by the theory of opposites: it only 
provides a continuous movement, without the possibility of stability in this flux. Cebes therefore 
rightly suggests that the soul might last longer than the body – as the weaver lasts longer than his 
cloaks – but at some point the soul might perish as well. It is then interesting that Cebes’ counter-
argument, as opposed to the easily dismissed argument of Simmias, is never referred to as an 
aporia. This might indicate that Cebes’ argument is in fact not an aporia precisely because it 
provides a new way, and shows us that in fact the idea of a circular physics was not the right way; 
it blocked the way, or was a dead end. The weaver-argument problematizes the theory of 
opposites and, as such, is not a blockage, not an aporia. Instead, the theory of opposites is now 
considered to be an aporia while the new theory provides new ways, opens up new possibilities. 
This new voyage is Socrates’ “second sailing” which is first of all Socrates’ own attempt to find 
“the cause of generation and decay” after Anaxagoras and others dissappointed him. Secondly, it 
is a new way within the dialogue, to prove the immortality of the soul, after Cebes has shown that 
the first attempt (the theory of opposites) did not lead us anywhere, but was – so to speak – a 
roadblock. Thirdly, as discussed above, the ideal realm of forms – Socrates’ own sailing – is the 
best possible logos for Socrates. Approximating the divine truth it is the most secure and safest 
vessel to cross the sea, or the best way one can find through the labyrinth.  
The development of the above-described arguments shows that the labyrinth of ways and non-
ways is in a constant flux: ways turn out to be non-ways; non-ways can become ways. The flux of 
the dialogue can be intimidating. As discussed in the Republic, the Protagoras and the Phaedo, 
many people develop a fear for dialectic. This is a fear for falling into a labyrinth like Tartarus, 
described at the end of the Phaedo.55 Tartarus is a labyrinth in which no progress is possible; no 
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distinction can be made between better and worse ways since every way will lead back to the 
same point. This is the fear that one can have of philosophy: the fear of not being able to get 
anywhere; the fear of not getting out, or the fear of not finding anything stable, but only a flux in 
which navigation is impossible. 
Socrates addressed this problem earlier in the Phaedo after Simmias and Cebes gave their 
arguments, and everyone – including Echecrates to whom Phaedo narrates the last day of 
Socrates’ life – seemed to be at a loss about the direction that they had to take now. They first 
thought Socrates’ arguments were sound and stable but now Simmias’ and Cebes’ arguments, 
which dismiss the earlier arguments, are very convincing as well. Echecrates phrases the fear for 
a flux in which nothing is stable by asking, “What argument shall we believe henceforth?”56 
Before discussing Simmias’ and Cebes’ arguments Socrates first – as if he hears Echecrates’ 
question in the frame-dialogue – discusses with Phaedo the possibility of misology, hatred of 
arguments. Socrates wants to prevent us from thinking that “there is nothing sound and sure in 
anything, whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the tide in the 
Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time.”57 In a dialogue such as the Phaedo we 
encounter many conflicting arguments and, consequently, we could easily become either 
relativists or postmodernists, or – as Socrates fears – misologists, for whom there is no possibility 
of a logos that is “true and sure and can be learned.”58 What we are left with then is dialectic 
itself in which one does not argue in the way “quite uncultured persons” do, who “do not care 
what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views 
seem true to their hearers.”59 Instead of this persuasion of others, the true dialectician wants to 
convince himself.  Yet, precisely this “selfish attitude” – as Socrates calls it – requires a partner 
with whom to talk things through. In order to find one’s way one needs company. Socrates 
himself is the ultimate example of this “need for company.” It is true that Socrates is a guide who 
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leads the others into and somehow through the labyrinth, and as this guide he is resourceful for 
others, but in order to be this guide Socrates too needs company; he needs dialogue. He can only 
be resourceful in the company of others; he can only find his way by way of a dialogue. 
 
Conclusion: The Dialectical Voyage 
The need for dialectic is emphasized in the Protagoras, when Socrates cites Homer “when two 
go together, one observes before the other; [Iliad, x. 224] for somehow it makes all of us human 
beings more resourceful [εὺπορώτεροι] in every deed or word or thought.”60 This “going 
together” that makes more resourceful is in the Protagoras an opposition of positions of the 
interlocutors that leads to a reversal of their positions. Protagoras is made “better” – he becomes 
more resourceful – by learning from Socrates that virtue cannot be taught by way of long 
monologues. In the Phaedo the interlocutors “go together” since Socrates takes up the theory of 
his opponents. In this way Cebes is able to dismiss his own metaphysical ideas through an 
ingenious dialectic in which he revalues his own values. The Pythagorean theory of opposites is 
an aporia, is therefore dismissed, but is at the same time at work within the dialogue as a non-
way that provides a way precisely in being a non-way. In a sense, we could say, the Socratic-
Platonic dialogue is the embodiment of the physics of circularity, discussed in the theory of 
opposites. Although dialectic – like navigation – looks at a world beyond the physical movement 
between opposites, dialectic itself does belong to the world of flux. The reversal of positions of 
the Protagoras, and, in the Phaedo, the presentation of the theory of opposites, which in the end 
is not supported by any of the interlocutors, are precisely examples of this flux or circular 
movement. Through dialectic – a philosophical navigation – a way can be found through the 
movement of ways and non-ways that one (either as a reader or as an interlocutor) encounters in a 
dialogue. 
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The image of the labyrinth shows us that to run into an aporia is not only a running into a blind 
alley, but is rather a re-direction indicating a detour, or to start all over again. In this way poverty 
– the poverty of an argument – becomes resourcefulness. Similar to Poros, in the myth told by 
Diotima in the Symposium, who can only be resourceful in the company of Penia, Socrates can 
only be resourceful in the company of poor arguments that do not prove what they are supposed 
to prove. In the Phaedo he provides poor arguments, and by doing so he makes his interlocutors 
much more resourceful than they could have ever been without his company. Socrates’ poverty is 
his resourcefulness. This ambiguous resourcefulness, though, works only in the company of 
others; he is in need of a partner.61 Dialectic is a logos in which one can change positions in an 
attempt to find a way through the labyrinth. As a philosophical navigator the dialectician 
establishes, or smushes together, a way as he goes along. The labyrinth through which one tries to 
find a way is thus itself established in the process of doing dialectic. By way of questioning the 
different theories, hypotheses will be destroyed in order to make progress. In finding and 
constructing a path, the dialectician constructs the labyrinth, and in doing so s/he gazes at 
intangible things, in order to determine a course that will hopefully lead in the right direction. 
What we learn from Socrates is not primarily some logos, some theory, account, or doctrine. We 
rather learn the method to get to such an answer, that is, dialectic, the process of finding ways 
(poroi), finding non-ways (aporias) and finding new ways through a labyrinth.  
This paper started with the presumption that there is such a thing as a Platonic or Socratic 
method. Here at the conclusion of this paper the question should be answered whether dialectic 
indeed is a method, and what sort of method this is. What exactly have the metaphors of sailing 
and navigation told us about Plato’s method, besides that the dialectical process could be 
described as a journey? First of all, we have seen that, specifically in the Phaedo and Protagoras, 
Plato lets Socrates entice his interlocutors in the dialogue. The dialogue is a labyrinth in which 
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the interlocutors and the readers of the text become entangled. Plato lures his readers by 
presenting several conflicting theories and arguments. These conflicts (and the urge to resolve 
these conflicts) draw the reader into the dialectical process. 
Secondly, I have discussed how that dialectical process is analogous to navigation. 
Philosophizing by way of dialectic is not a standard procedure that can be learned and applied. It 
is, rather, a method that is always different, depending upon the circumstances. The ocean of 
speech is constantly changing, and as the navigator adapts to the movement of the stars, the seas 
and the winds, so should the philosopher adapt to the movement of the arguments. 
The way in which the philosopher finds “truth” has shown to be not an established path or road, 
not a hodos. The dialogue lays out a journey as a poros, a path that has to be created while it is 
being taken, an endeavor closely resembling sailing through the ocean, which is never the same. 
As a metaphor for dialectic, navigation tells us that dialectic is applied differently each time it is 
used.  
Can dialectic then be called a meta ta hodos, or methodos? For, if there is a lack of a standard 
way (hodos), dialectic is never a standardized journey. Dialectic as navigation is a finding of the 
way, either through a sea that is constantly changing, or through a labyrinth in which a way or 
resource (poros) can become a non-way (aporia) and vice versa. Human beings can approximate 
the truth by trying to find the best possible vessel to cross the sea, and this vessel is, for Plato, 
dialectic. Dialectic is both the development of this vessel and this very vessel itself. The 
metaphor of the labyrinth, similarly, has illustrated that the unfolding of the dialogue itself is the 
construction of a multiplicity of ways and non-ways. It is thus my claim that the development or 
construction of the dialogue lacks a standard method. Method is not pre-established, but the result 
of dialectic, the dialogue itself, can once it is established be called a method, i.e. a thinking 
through of different positions either with a real or an imaginary partner. 
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NOTES 
1. This essay reexamines the question of Socratic-Platonic dialectic by taking into account the 
dramatic and literary context of the dialectic at work in the Protagoras and Phaedo.  Hence, this 
paper discusses Socratic-Platonic dialectic. 
2. The elenchus is often used in describing the Socratic dialectical method. This model in its 
simple form can be sketched as follows: Socrates lets one of his interlocutors pose a definition of 
x, after which Socrates will interrogate the interlocutor up to the point where the latter has to 
admit that his definition was, indeed, wrong and that he does not know what x is. This model of 
the elenchus can indeed be found in some dialogues – I think especially in the “early” dialogues. 
Discussions about this model are often focused upon the outcome of the elenchus: scholars such 
as Gregory Vlastos argue that the outcome is positive, i.e. there is an actual result (see, for 
example Vlastos’ article “The Socratic Elenchus: Method is all” (1994)). Others argue that there 
is no positive outcome possible, and that only a deprivation of knowledge can be acknowledged 
(see for example Robinson’s Plato’s Earlier Dialectic (1953). For an elaborate discussion of 
these positions see: Francisco Gonzales, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of 
Philosophical Inquiry, Northwestern University, SPEP studies in Historical Philosophy, 
Evanston, 1998, pp. 1-16. 
3. Metaphors referring to sailing and navigation are used throughout the Platonic corpus. It lies 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all these references, although I have attempted to 
include all sailing and navigation metaphors that refer to method.  
4. The term “way” is – I would say – one of the crucial terms in: John Sallis, Being and Logos: 
Reading the Platonic Dialogues, Third Edition, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, 1996. Sallis’ “way” leads out of the city and back into it, up and down. Although 
the “way” I describe is not first of all one of “logos” or – to or from – “being,” it can, indeed, be 
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characterized by such a double directionality in the sense that the ways of philosophizing are 
never stable and can even change from ways into non-ways. 
5. Plato, Protagoras, in: Plato II, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, W.R.M. Lamb (tr.), 
Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, 1977, further: Protagoras, 312e, my emphasis. 
6. Protagoras, 317a. 
7. Protagoras, 317a. 
8. Protagoras, 319a. 
9. Protagoras, 334d. 
10. Protagoras, 335a. This reference to his reputation hints at one of the problems the two are 
struggling with in the entire dialogue: who is giving the class, or leading the discussion, 
Protagoras or Socrates? So far, obviously, Protagoras has been the teacher since he gives long 
monologues. A transformation to the Socratic method is, therefore, a serious threat to Protagoras, 
who might loose control over the discussion, which again might hurt his reputation. 
11. Protagoras, 336c/d. 
12. Protagoras, 344e. 
13. Protagoras, 318b. 
14. Protagoras, 361a. 
15. Protagoras, 338a. 
16. Unfortunately, we do not know exactly what the Greeks knew about navigation. In Homer’s 
Odyssey the ships seem to be navigated more by the gods than anything else. However, we have 
to take into consideration that the stars and the winds are not necessarily differentiated from the 
gods. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle characterizes navigation, along with ethics and 
medicine, as an art that does not have “exact precision” in which “the agents themselves have to 
consider what is suited to the circumstances on each occasion” (II, ii, 4). The passage from the 
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Republic that I discuss here gives us a more concrete indication about how they actually 
navigated.  
17. Plato, Republic, Allen Bloom (tr.), Basic Books, 1991, further: Republic, 488b – 489a. 
18. Republic, 488d. 
19. Republic, 485b. 
20. Republic, 484b. 
21. Republic, 484d. 
22. Although this is speculative, we could assume that the metaphor of sailing through the sea 
refers to Heraclitus’ idea of flux. 
23. Republic, 533c. 
24. Republic, 533c. 
25. Republic, 533d. 
26. Plato, “Phaedo,” in: Plato I, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, tr. H.N. Fowler, 
Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, 1971, further: Phaedo, 99d. 
27. Phaedo, 85c. 
28. Phaedo, 85c. 
29. Phaedo, 85d. 
30. Sarah Kofman, “Beyond Aporia?” In: Post-Structuralist Classics, Andrew Benjamin (ed.), 
Routledge, New York, 1988. Original title: Comment s’en sortir? Editions Galilée, Paris, 1983, 
further:  Beyond Aporia? p. 10. 
31. Plato, “Phaedo,” in: Plato’s Phaedo, Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, Eric Salem (tr.), Focus 
Classical Library, Newburyport, 1998, further: Brann, 100a. 
32. Much has been written about this “autobiography.” Reale identifies it in his magnificent 
Toward a New Interpretation of Plato as “[o]ne of the most famous and magnificent passages 
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that Plato has left us” (Giovanni Reale, Toward a New Interpretation of Plato, John R. Catan and 
Richard Davies (Tr.), The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 95). 
Even though what is at stake here in the dialogue are causes of generation and destruction, I here 
do not want to focus on causality, as discussed, for example, by Sallis (1996, pp. 38-44) and 
Gonzales (1998, pp. 188-208). Instead, I want to emphasize the change in method that is 
symbolized by the “second sailing.” 
33. Brann, 97b. 
34. Phaedo, 58b. 
35. Much more can be said about the myth, but since it is not certain which version(s) of the myth 
was/were known to Plato, I have tried to summarize the basic elements of the story.  
36. Phaedo, 58c. 
37. Phaedo, 58a-b. 
38. In fact, there are more people present in the prison, but only fourteen people are named here 
by Phaedo. Interestingly, the fourteen names are, when Phaedo enumerates the names, grouped in 
a set of seven Athenians, two additional Athenians and five foreigners. This could be seen as 
another reference to the “twice seven.” 
39. Plato, “Symposium,” in: Plato III, Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias, W.R.M. Lamb (tr.), Loeb 
Classical Library, Cambridge, 1996, 177d. 
40. Socrates is not the slave-doctor, but rather the “free-born doctor” of the Laws. He is the free-
born doctor who tries to find the real cause of such illnesses, the origin from which nature 
unfolds (ὰρχη̃ς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν (Laws, 720d)). 
41. In the whole Platonic corpus the word “labyrinth” is used only once, at least explicitly: “at 
this point we were involved in a labyrinth: when we supposed we had arrived at the end, we 
twisted about again and found ourselves practically at the beginning of our search, and just as 
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sorely in want as when we first started on it” (Euthydemus, 291b-c). The image of the labyrinth 
here suggests the difficulty, or in fact the impossibility, of finding ways that lead to the truth. In 
the two dialogues discussed here we can find a similar idea. In the Protagoras Socrates and 
Protagoras are at the end of the dialogue still opposed to one another and in the Phaedo we are 
left with nothing more than good hopes about the immortality of the soul. 
42. Phaedo, 70e. 
43. Phaedo, 71c. 
44. Phaedo, 72b. 
45. Phaedo, 72c. 
46. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1980, p. 25. 
47. Phaedo, 72e. 
48. Phaedo, 74e. 
49. Phaedo, 75c. 
50. Phaedo, 74a. 
51. Phaedo, 77c. 
52. Phaedo, 84b-c, my emphasis.  
53. Brann, 84c-d. 
54. It is this peculiar character of Socrates to which Kofman alludes in her Beyond Aporia? when 
she makes her famous analysis of the figures of poros, penia and eros as we find them in 
Diotima’s speech in the Symposium. Eros is the child of poros and penia; poros is the father, the 
resourceful, who has possibilities to find ways and penia is the mother, who is poor. The child of 
these parents, eros is “[n]either mortal nor immortal, Love is a daemon, an intermediary being. 
Neither wise nor ignorant, he is a philosopher […].” Kofman, Beyond Aporia? p. 26. 
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55. Phaedo111c-114c. 
56. Phaedo, 88d. 
57. Phaedo, 90c. 
58. Phaedo, 90c. 
59. Phaedo, 91a. 
60. Protagoras, 348d. 
61. We can see this, for example, in the Symposium where Socrates is supposed to give a eulogy, 
but starts off with a short dialogue with Agathon. He eventually does give a eulogy on love, but 
in the form of an (imaginary) dialogue with Diotima. In order to give an account, to provide a 
logos, Socrates thus needs dialectic, possibly even with an imaginary interlocutor.  Since his 
imaginary eulogy can be seen as a continuation of his dialogue with Agathon, we find here again 
a reversal of positions in which Socrates adopts the position of Agathon, and Diotima adopts 
Socrates’ position. 
